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THE LESSON OF 
CZECHOSLOV AKIA 
By ROBERT G. SPIVACK 
A S NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN alighted from his airplane 
n at Heston airport, returning from Munich, he 
waved a scrap of paper on which was written: 
"We regard the agreement signed last night and 
the Anglo-German naval agreement as symbolic 
of the desires of our two peoples never to go to 
war with one another again." 
In a prepared statement read to the newsreelmen 
Chamberlain boasted that he had won "peace in our 
time, peace with honor." 
That is the Munich contract. In order to obtain 
Herr Hitler's signature Mr. Chamberlain gladly sacri-
ficed Czechoslovakia. In order to obtain Mr. Cham-
berlain's signature Herr Hitler had only to growl. 
From the table-talk at Munich peace was to come. 
Men of England acclaimed Chamberlain, as they put 
away their faultily constructed gas masks (but did 
not destroy them). The people of France cheered 
Daladier and the Socialists voted confidence in him. 
But most significant were the spontaneous sighs of 
relief that went up in Berlin and Rome as the brow-
beaten citizens of those nations learned that the war, 
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for which their desperado leaders were preparIng 
them, had not yet come. 
Yet within two weeks of the Munich conference 
the following results were evident: 
1. Hitler spoke at Saarbrucken and acclaimed Mus-
solini as the only "real friend" Germany has In 
Europe. 
2. Neville Chamberlain demonstrated his trust In 
the words of his estimable colleague beyond the 
Rhine by insisting that British rearmament be rushed 
as quickly as possible. 
3. Hitler openly interfered in British internal 
affairs by inferring that the overthrow of Chamber-
lain and the election of "an Eden, Cooper, or 
Churchill" would mean war. 
4. President Roosevelt "viewing the even ts in 
Europe" finds it necessary to push forw'ard American 
armament to an all-time peak. For this the isolation-
ists have themselves to thank. They prevented the 
alternative: international cooperation. 
5. In Palestine rebellion has broken out, inspired 
by Italian propaganda and German arms. The arch-
imperialists have incited Arabs by appealing to their 
anti-imperialist sentiments. 
6. Brazil and Germany have withdrawn their 
ambassadors as a result of continued Nazi interference 
in the internal affairs of the former nation. 
7. Cardinal Innitzer was stoned in St. Stephen'S 
Cathedral for urging Catholic youths to stand by 
their convictions. 
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8. The British press and radio have seen fit to 
"impose a self-censorship" in discussing Germany. 
"It would be senseless, so the contention goes, to-
antagonize the dictatorships unnecessarily at the 
present time," writes Ferdinand Kuhn in The New-
York Times on October 16, "especially since they are 
so sensitive to the slightest disparagement from-
abroad." Information from London indicates that 
Lord Halifax drops a hint here and there when a 
newspaper becomes a trifle outspoken. France i~ cen-
soring her radio. 
9. Germany and Italy continue to aid General 
Franco, notwithstanding a "token witpdrawar' of 
troops from Spain. v\Tounded soldiers who probably 
could no longer fight, and did not wish to in the first 
place, make up the bulk . of those returning home. 
10. Japan opens a drive towards Canton, ignoring 
"stern warnings" by the British foreign office that 
interests of the Empire will be protected. Who is 
afraid of big, bad Britain? 
THE TASK MADE HARDER 
With the loss of Czechoslovakia there can be no 
denial of the fact that the cause of freedom has suf-
fered a body blow. Pollyanna-isms have no place in 
an appraisal of the situation arising from Munich. 
But there is no time now to succumb to the forces of 
darkness. Hard as the job has become, the only alter-
native to continuing the battle is suicide. Those who 
prefer that way out may take it; but certainly those 
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who are to continue living have no time now for talk 
of surrender or for accepting the "inevitability" of 
fascism's triumph. 
What has happened to Czechoslovakia is a grim 
story. 
In a Europe which has grown blacker since Musso-
lini's "march" on Rome and Hitler's assault on 
German democracy there stood a beacon named 
Czechoslovakia. 
A nation, like the United States, consisting of many 
peoples, it arose from the ashes of the World War to 
blossom forth in twenty years as a full-fledged and 
relatively prosperous republic. Inhabited by a hard-
working, self-sacrificing, idealistic people, its Germans, 
Slovaks, Magyars, Czechs and others lived side by side 
with a minimum of difficulty and antagonism. Loftier 
than most political leaders of post-war Europe tow-
ered Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, statesman, philoso-
pher, democrat, who believed that social problems 
would only be solved in a free nation. "The first 
President of our nation was the son of a little worker," 
Eduard Benes told this writer, "the second President 
is the son of a little peasant," he added proudly. 
A simple people, the Czechoslovaks had faith that 
by acting decently, observing their pledges, and living 
righteously they could withstand all the attacks of 
sabre":rattlers outside and demagogues within the 
nation. Not so airy-minded that they expected respect 
if they were a meek nation, a strong ' and well-
equipped army was formed, to defend and not to in-
S 
vade. But the only opportunity for democracy to 
survive, Benes told us, was for it courageously to meet 
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its problems, never to slur over them, and thus make 
itself strong. The sensational characteristics of the 'new 
republic lay not in gay night clubs, nor exciting 
politics, but in the cool determination that it had a 
job to do, a function to play in society. "You will not 
find anything to write about us," Karl Capek once 
told John Gunther. But it was in these things that 
there was so much to be said. It was an unflinching 
will to remain a free people that kept alive their 
fight for freedom in the middle ages, through the 
Austrian Empire, and finally out of it grew the 
republic. 
CZECHOSLOVAK MINORITIES PROBLEM 
Gilbert Murray, in a letter to The Times of Lon-
don (May 18, 1938), says: 
"Up to a short time ago Czechoslovakia was 
acknowledged to be both the most successful and 
the best governed and conducted of the states 
cre<l:ted or emancipated by the Great War .... 
During the four years in which I was intimately 
concerned in the protection of minorities by the 
Council of the League [of Nations] I have no hesi-
tation in saying that the minorities in Czecho-
slovakia were the best treated in Europe, and that 
I never found Mr. Benes other than fair-minded 
and ready to help. The situation seems to have 
deteriorated of late years, owing partly to eco-
nomic distress, intensified by the German exclu-
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sion of Czech goods and partly to the fear inspired 
in the ordinary population by the aggressive 
policy of the Nazi govemment~ 
"A sharp distinction should be made between 
(a) the honest relief of the Sudeten-Deutsch 
grievances, advocated by J aksch, the German 
Social-Democrat leader" and (b) the Nazification 
of the Sudeten territory, largely by means of 
terrorism, which, whatever Henlein's own wishes 
may be, seems to be the object of the German 
government. - The first is both desirable in itself 
and compatible with the continued existence of 
Czechoslovakia, the second is neither." 
The total number of Germans living in areas with 
a German majority is 2,495,633. These areas are 
divided and do not touch upon. each other. Germans 
are in the majority of eight different areas uncon-
nected with each other and separated by bands of 
territory inhabited by a majority of Czechs or one 
of the minorities. Therefore it must be recognized 
that the German minority cannot be geographically 
divided from the rest of the country. Nevertheless the 
Germans have been united on certain minority rights 
and have presented them from time to time. -
Under the constitution adopted in 1920 equal 
civil and political rights were guaranteed to all na-
tional groups, free use of maternal language in private 
and business contacts, in religious life, in the press, 
and business meetings. National groups were guar-
anteed equal cultural and educational facilities. -
The Electoral Law, adopted at the same time as the 
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constitution, granted equal and universal suffrage. 
The minorities were allotted numbers of deputies 
and senators according to their numerical proportions 
in the state; e.g.) the German minority 'was allotted 
72 deputies out of the 300 forming the Chamber of 
Deputies, and 87 out of the 150 Senators. 
THE GERMAN-SPEAKING MINORITY 
Since June, 1919, members of the minorities have 
been able to take part in, or, if they are in the ma-
jority, control the administration of the communes 
in 'which they live. Out of a total of 15,734 parishes 
and communes in the country, 3,466 have an abso-
lute majority of Germans, and on the basis of pro-
por~ional representation in all of these communes, 
administration was exclusively or mainly in German 
hands. Out of the 239 district councils in the republic 
50 have a German majority, and in the case of the 
provincial councils, the Germans were represented · 
according to their numerical strength. Thus, in the 
provincial council of Bohemia, there were 37 Ger-
mans out of 120 members. 
These councils appointed and controlled their own 
police forces except in the large towns; they ap-
pointed their own magistrates and officials; they 
handled all questions of public health, social services 
and relief and supplied the buildings and the mate-
rials for the schools. 
It is interesting to find that in the large German 
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towns, such as Karlsbad, which have also a large 
Czech minori ty, all the officials were German. 
The Language ' Law of Czechoslovakia gave the 
widest latitude in the use 6f minority tongues In 
courts, schools, and all phases of administration. 
GERMAN SCHOOLS IN CZECHOSLOV ARIA 
German-speaking people, while only 22 per cent of 
the population, had 35 per cent of the educational 
facili ties of the nation. The Germans had a propor-
tionately greater number of elementary, secondary, 
teachers' training and technical schools and colleges 
than the Czechs themselves. For the school year 
1934-35 the schools and pupils were as follows: * 
Czechs Germans Hungarians Poles 
Elemen tary . . . .. . . .. 10,417 3,283 807 90 
Number of Pupils . . 1,242,486 342,424 100,115 9,737 
Higher Elementary . . 1,423 443 13 11 
Number of Pupils . . . 328,835 87,153 2,695 2,605 
Secondary & teachers' 
training . . ........ 247 83 6 
Number of Pupils . . . 99,672 28,848 4,156 576 
In addition the Germans had a university, two 
technical colleges and 193 public technical schools. 
But the Germans have always been dissatisfied with 
the fact that their language has not had the same 
*Statistical material prepared by Miss Dorothy McConnell, 
Secretary National Women's Committee of the American 
League for Peace and Democracy, from reports issued by the 
World Committee Against War and Fascism. 
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legal standing throughout the country as the Czech 
language. Furthermore they have wanted the com-
plete control of the education of German children in 
their hands . 
. In spite of their complaints, the German popula-
tion gave no indication of wanting to become a part 
of Germany. They are not immigrants from Germany. 
They have lived for generations in the towns where 
they now live. They were merely interest~d in se-
curing greater rights under the form of government 
that they possessed. This feeling was capitalized by 
Konrad Henlein soon after the world depression 
struck Czechoslovakia. 
Czechoslovakia was affected by the depression in 
the most distressing manner. Practically all the out-
put of its industry was designed for export. The 
German population have always lived in the most 
industrialized sections of Czechoslovakia and are the 
ones who own and work in the factories to a large 
extent. Their distress was further intensified by the 
exclusion of Czechoslovakian goods by Germany. 
Factories were idle, the number of unemployed grew 
rapidly, and the factory owners were thrown into 
panic. It was a time of apprehension and a time for 
the Nazi principles of the Sudeten German Party to 
find good soil for seed. An "ideology" which had, up 
to this time, found few supporters began to be promul-
gated throughou t the Sudeten area. 
Added to the propitiousness of the times for the 
growth of the S.D.P. (Sudeten German Party) were 
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the methods of the party under the leadership of 
Konrad Henlein. The methods were almost exactly 
those employed by Hitler's adherents in the early 
days of his rise to power. 
HENLEIN'S NAZI METHODS 
A boycott became extremely effective In the areas 
where the S.D.P. was strongest. Non-supporters of 
the S.D.P. had not only their places of business boy-
cotted but they were warned to leave their lodgings. 
A particularly vehement boycott was carried on 
against the many . cooperative societies of workers. 
The techniques closely followed the Gennan boy-
cott against the Jews. Cooperative buildings were 
placarded. Shopping in cooperative stores was strict-
ly forbidden to members of the S.D.P. Persons shop-
ping in cooperatives were watched and warned by 
letters. These petty persecutions probably had more 
effect in breaking the morale of many of the coopera-
tive societies than the more violent persecutions. 
Other workers' associations were "persuaded" to 
. join the S.D.P. and become supporters of it. In one 
case-a Hairdressers' Association-a motion was put 
to join the S.D.P. The chairman and one of the 
members spoke against it. The result was -that a boy-
cott was immediately invoked against them and both 
were run out of business. With the economic distress 
growing more acute daily it is easy to understand 
why there were so many "unanimous" decisions of 
workers' associations to join the S.D.P. 
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A man applying for work was always asked if he 
were a member of the S.D.P. The S.D.P. member got 
the job. 
N or did the boycott apply only to workers' associa-
tions, stores and individual renters of lodgings. In 
Kaaden an order went out from the S.D.P. headquar-
ters that members of the S.D.P. were . not allowed to 
give away kitchen waste, generally used for the goats 
kept by the poor in the town, unless the poor were 
supporters of Henlein! 
Combined with the boycott was a very effective 
propaganda campaign-usually painting the oppor-
tunities of life under the Hitler regime in very glow-
ing colors indeed. Nazi Germany was portrayed as a 
government under · which there was no unemployment 
and the wages were high. Some of these propaganda 
campaigns over-shot themselves. In one case a group 
of Sudeten brick-layers were so impressed with the 
stories of Germany that they crossed the border ~ for 
work. They returned with the report that while they 
had found work they had found working conditions 
much worse than in Czechoslovakia. This and other 
similar stories made the rounds so that underneath the 
propaganda there has always been a touch of skepti-
cism on the part of the Sudeten Germans. 
In the early days of the coming to ·power of the Hen-
lein party the Czechoslovakian government did not 
interfere. It was alarmed at the growing aggressive-
ness of the Nazi government across the border. At 
the same time it laid 'special emphasis on the pro-
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tection of all the rights of the minorities under its 
constitution and electoral laws. 
Meantime Hitler was arousing his own people to 
the "distressing'" plight of their fellow-Germans across 
the border. In February, 1938, before his triumphal 
march into Austria, he said in a speech in the Reich-
stag: 
"Over ten million Germans live in two of the 
states adjoining our frontiers. . . . We cannot 
dispute the fact that as long as Germany was 
feeble and powerless, she simply had to endure 
these persecutions of Germans across her fron-
tiers. Just as England looks after her interests 
which cover a large part of the ,,,,orId, so also will 
the Germany of today look after her, in compari-
son, restricted interests. And to these interests of 
the German Reich belongs also the protection of 
those fellow-Germans who live beyond our fron-
tiers and are unable to ensure for themselves the 
right to general freedom, personal, political and 
ideological.' , 
The i)urrender of Austria occurred shortly after. 
By April Konrad Henlein at the S.D.P. Congress 
at Karlsbad declared that no solution of German 
minority rights would be acceptable unless it was 
based on the following principles: 
1. Full equality of status for Czechs and 
Germans. 
2. A guarantee for this equality by the recogni-
tion of the Sudeten Germans as a legal body in-
corporate. 
3. Determination and legal recognition of the 
German areas within the state. 
4. Full self-government for the German areas. 
5. Legal protection for every citizen living out-
side the area of his own nationality. 
6. Removal of injustices inflicted since 1918 
and reparations for damages caused thereby. 
7. Recogni tion of the principle: German offi-
cials wi thin the German area. 
8. Full liberty to profess German nationality 
and German political philosophy. 
These demands were immediately opposed in the 
majority of the Czech papers, which recognized them 
not as an attempt to find a satisfactory solution of the 
minority problem, but as an attempt to disrupt the 
Czechoslovakian government in the interests of Hitler 
Germany. 
It was agreed by the government that Premier 
Hodza, while rejecting Henlein's demands, should 
open negotiations with the Sudeten German Party 
on modified terms. The Czech coalition parties unani-
mously expressed their desire to satisfy the demands 
of the various minorities, subject only to the sover-
eignty and integrity of the state and of its 'democratic 
structure. 
On May 20 Premier Hodza announced that the 
government had drafted a complete solution of the 
whole minority problem which would cut deeply 
into the existing state administration. But the gov-
ernment was determined to fulfill its obligations both 
to the coun try and to Europe. Czechoslovakia wished 
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to settle the question of the relations between the 
various nationalities on her territory in the principles 
'Of justice. 
On May 22 the first of the municipal elections was 
held in Sudeten-German towns and counties. The 
elections were held at a time extremely favorable to 
the S.D.P. Austria had been annexed, Germany stood 
ready across the border to step in in case any incident 
occurred. German propaganda broadcasts were hum-
ming across the border continuously. 
SUDETENS LOYAL TO CZECH STATE 
Until this time there had been no hint of a plebis-
cite of the German-Sudetens concerning the cession 
of their area to Germany. Henlein had said some 
time before: 
"The welfare of the Sudetens is indissolubly 
bound up with the welfare of the Czechoslovak 
Republic. We stand in principle and unani-
mously for loyalty to this state. For more than 
a thousand years Germans and Czechs have lived 
together in these lands, and always their fate has 
been common in times of distress and in times of 
prosperity." 
Even immediately before the elections there was no 
hint of secession by Henlein and his followers. The 
Henleinists were attempting to use the elections to 
show the international public that the entire Sudeten-
German public stood for Henlein. What followed 
the elections is now history. 
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It was a decent people that Neville Chamberlain 
sacrificed. It was a growing, virile, clean young state 
that was offered on the altar by the corrupt action of 
the Prime Minister of a once "Great" Britain. It is 
too . much to expect that two men like Chamberlain 
and Daladier, who would betray the interests of their 
own nations for selfish class interests, could under-
stand what Czechoslovakia symbolized. Moreover, it 
is folly to talk of their "crawling by airplane" to 
Hitler. Th@y went as partners. 
But the full price of the treachery has not yet been 
paid and the pity is that it will not be the Cliveden set 
or the 200 families of France who will do the paying. 
It will be paid by the peoples of many countries. 
The cost to Czechoslovakia has been a dear one. 
Not only has Germany received the Sudeten area, 
which never was hers and whose people in large part 
had no "home in the Reich" to which they wished to 
return, but other vultures have quickly come to claim 
a portion of the prostrate body. Poland took Teschen. 
Hungary is still negotiating with one hand on a gun. 
An "autonomous" Slovak state within a state has been 
set up by reactionaries who go to Berlin for advice. 
The Left political parties are threatened with repres-
sion at Hitler's insistence. Thousands of bewildered 
emigres from the Sudeten areas do not know in which 
direction to tum. With a straight face Sir Neill 
Malcolm has asked Prague to care for them. "In the 
name of humanitarianism I appeal to you," he told 
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General Syrovy. "Humanitarianism," was the reply, 
"that is a strange word." 
The hearts of democratic Czechoslovaks are heavy. 
Nor is it their voice which says that free Germans 
must be returned to the concentration camps. It is '" 
not the men of liberty who ask Hitler to "mediate" 
the differences with Hungary. 
"We wanted to sing with the angels," a Prague 
journalist commented, "but now we must howl with 
the wolves." Bitter, tired, disillusioned there is no 
difficulty in understanding their feelings, yet the 
Czechs have known misery before, have often had to 
fight for their freedom. They are not yet dead. Fascism 
may rule the economic and political life of the na-
tion; Hitler may decide the new borders, but in the 
minds of its people the values for which they have 
'long struggled are lasting; and to them Eduard 
Benes is yet President of Czechoslovakia. 
THE PRICE TO BE PAID 
The ten items listed earlier show clearly enough 
how real the peace of Munich is. There is now evi-
dence to believe that the war scare which occurred 
during the last two weeks of September, 1938, was a 
phony. ' 
When he resigned from his Cabinet post, Alfred 
Duff Cooper revealed that Germany was encouraged 
in her demands, because at the same time that the 
British navy -was being mobilized, words were being 
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poured into the ears of the Reichsfuehrer that it was 
all camouflage, that Great Britain did not mean busi-
ness. A United Press dispatch from Berlin revealed 
that Marshal Goering was worried nonetheless be-
cause he knew that in a real test of strength Germany 
could not stand up against England, France and the 
Soviet Union. One German general added: "We 
would have to fight in the air, by sea, on the land, and 
our own people." Mussolini was ready to play Italy's 
historic role as a vacillating ally. . 
But most significant is a dispatch from the Rome 
office of the Associated Press on September 15. It met 
the censor's approval. 
"ROME, September 15 (AP)-Reports that 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had talked 
with the Premiers of Italy and France before 
meeting Adolph Hitler raised the question tonight 
whether four-power talks might develop to ward 
off a European war. 
"In these circles an attempt to solve the Czecho-
slovakian crisis through an accord among the 
four great European powers seemed possible. 
"A usually reliable source said Chamberlain 
telephoned Premier Benito M ussolini to de-
termine his attitude before flying to talk with 
Hitler at Berchtesgaden." 
This item was buried in the midst of more sensa-
tional news about war preparations, babies in gas 
masks, and Mr. Chamberlain's Nazi salute. But for 
those who believed that all the dramatic gestures, the 
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three ai~lane flights to Hitler, the tearful speech in 
the House of Commons, interrupted by Sir John 
Simon, were spontaneous this should be revealing. In 
gangster terminology, which seems appropriate, it was 
a frame-up. 
But if the British Tories . played a malodorous role 
that of the French politicians was no less so. From 
evidence that newspapermen are discussing abroad it 
appears that behirid the scenes George Bonnet was 
doing his best to weaken the resistance of his own 
people. 
In the first place he is said to have discussed with 
Litvinov. the possibility of joint action by the Soviet 
Union wi th England and France. Li tvinov assured 
him that his nation would stand by its agreements. 
But Bonnet returned to the French Cabinet and de-
clared that Litvinov had refused to give commitments. 
This occasioned Li tvinov' s brillian t spe~ch in the 
League assembly where he made the Soviet position 
clear. 
At another date Bonnet asked the French general 
staff for a report on the Soviet army. While the first 
two pages were critical, the remainder of the docu-
ment was full of high praise. Bonnet is said to have 
sent only the first two pages to the Cabinet. 
At still another period Bonnet remarked that Gen-
eral Gamelin was afraid o~ the Siegfried line and that 
France would be stopped there. Actually Gamelin had 
remarked in nearly these words, "We could go through 
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the Siegfried line in three weeks as if it were mo-
lasses." 
Unexpected developments have already taken 
place to plague Great Britain for her part. First the 
Irish and then the South Africans demanded plebis-
cites. Then the German foreign office let a hint drop 
that possibly an aerial parity of one British plane for 
three German planes would be equalizing the in-
justices of Versailles! This must have riled the Tory 
governmen t, added to the ingra ti tude of the Saar-
brucken speech in which Hitler did not even consider 
Chamberlain as one of his friends. But they cooked · 
the meal-they must eat it. 
The people of France are paying even more and 
they know the blackmailers have not yet made their 
final demands. Daladier, in fear that the rising indig-
nation of the people would scrap his handiwork, as 
it had the Hoare-Laval Pact, has established a semi-
dictatorship. Typical Nazi campaigns against Jews 
are in motion in Alsace. Many secrets of the Maginot 
line have been divulged to the Germans by the seizure 
of the Czech fortifications which are on the same pat-
tern. A strong and willing Czech army has been de-
stroyed. The Franco-Soviet Pact has been scrapped, 
l~aving France without any real military ally. The 
post-war agreements made with the small nations in 
Central Europe are worthless, since "to be a friend 
of France is a dangerous thing,'.' as one member of the 
Chamber of Deputies puts it. 
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DILEMMA OF THE DEMOCRACIES 
Without any basis for real or lasting peace, Great 
Britain and France have reduced themselves to second-
rate powers. When Hitler beckons they must come. 
When he scowls they must cringe. 
"It is the dilemma of the democracies of Europe 
that the very sincerity of their desire for peace 
has encouraged the German government to make 
full use of the nuisance value of a threat of war," 
The New York Times commented. 
What has happened since Munich demonstrates 
that what Hitler calls "peace" and what democratic 
peoples call "peace" are two different things. What 
the democratic peoples have not yet learned is that 
the mere absence of war is not peace. What they are 
learning is that the gift of Czechoslovakia to fascism 
has created more problems than it has solved. By 
strengthening those governments which include mili-
tary conquest as an integral part of their philoso-
phies, war has only been postponed and perhaps made 
inevitable. 
The first lie to come out of Munich was the thesis 
that "permanent peace" had been · established. The 
second and more deadly is the notion that the ultimate 
tri urn ph of fascism is now assured. 
Two more lessons are clear since Munich. 
THE LESSON LEARNED 
First, and one which we shall do well to remember, 
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is that the German people by their demonstration of 
relief show that they do not follow the war machina-
tions of their rulers with the blind devotion we are 
so often told they practise. In his The Coming Victory 
of Democracy, Thomas Mann pleads with his readers 
not to do anything which will strengthen the present 
masters of the Reich if they really want to help the 
German people. The most certain way to help the 
German people is by refusing to provide Hitler with 
raw materials and credits which he still needs from 
abroad. Now more than ever an embargo and boycott 
against Germany can be potent. But second, and of 
greater importance to Americans, is the other lesson 
which Munich has taught. 
It became evident rapidly enough that Munich 
does not mean peace; and in the Gallup poll pub-
lished on October 14, 60 per cent of the people of 
the United States indicated that they realize this fact. 
If this is true, why is it? 
The reasons are many and complicated. Yet they 
can be simplified. First, in fairness to President Roose-
velt-who is being thanked by Mr. Chamberlain with 
such malicious intent that it seems like a "kiss of 
death" -it must be understood that the four-power 
conference at Munich was not what Roosevelt had in 
mind when he sent his notes to Hitler and the other 
governmental heads. In his second note Roosevelt 
made clear that he wanted a conference in "neutral 
territory" and with all the countries "particularly in-
terested" present. Whatever Munich is, it is not neu-
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tral territory. One might add without being accused 
of bias that Czechoslovakia, at least, was one of the 
"particularly interested" parties. One might even go 
so far as to suggest that Soviet Russia was as much 
concerned as Italy. What happened at Munich was 
not the Roosevelt plan. 
Yet the idea which the President put forth is worthy 
of further serious study and action. For the only 
method of stopping the costly, even disastrous trend 
in rearmament is by such an attempt of all nations to 
discuss and settle disputes under international law. 
The President should be urged to go further along 
this line. 
There is a second point. 
From the shabby ' treatment of Czechoslovakia there 
has arisen a storm of indig~ation throughout this na-
tion which can now be crystallized into a concrete 
program, designed to res tore some order in in tern a-
tional relations. The radio coverage of the recent 
events has demonstrated adequately that in this world 
there is and cannot be any isolation. Polls of popular 
opinion show that the American people are clearly 
on the side of the democratic nations. It was a dirty 
deal, most people agree. 
Very well, what is to be done about it? 
Since the Czechoslovakian people were abandoned 
the press of this nation has struck an almost unani-
mous note. Papers so removed from progressive thought 
as The New York Herald Tribune have been shocked 
and outraged. Dorothy Thompson who "prefers to 
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be called a conservative" has seen the issue with un-
usual clarity. Her columns have ' been brilliant and 
bitter. On September 22 she wrote: 
"Do you prefer death by dismemberment or 
death by the sword-answer 'yes' or 'no.' President ' 
Benes and .Premier Hodza asked permission to 
think a moment and made the shocking proposal 
of asking to have the case referred to the Court of 
International Justice in the Hague .... 
"When Lord Halifax read .of what had hap-
pened in Austria it is said that this Christian 
gentleman beat his brow and said: 'It is horrible! 
Horrible!' I wonder what he is going to say next 
week. 
"I wonder what the 'British people, one in 
mind and conscience' as the London Times so 
wittily says, with their righteous feeling towards 
minorities are going to do with the hordes of 
refugees who will try to trek their way out of 
Czechoslovakia, penniless and desperate ... ? 
"Great Britain is a great empire and I have no 
doubt that with her sympathies for the oppressed ' 
she will take them all in! 
"And I hope that Mrs. Chamberlain will pray 
for them to that peculiar Anglo-Saxon God of the 
upper classes who, just like the rain, bestows his 
favors on the just and unjust, according to ' the 
balance of power." 
Or in different vein but with the same disgust, the 
Portland Oregonian asks: 
"Was it necessary for Chamberlain to make a 
personal appearance to get the German dictator 
to accept exactly what he has been demanding all 
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along? ... Surely a telegram would have served as 
well-a telegram well within the ten-word limit. 
One reading 'Take what you want' surely would 
have prevented the outbreak of war, it being the 
intention to capitulate in practically all particu-
lars to German arrogance .... " 
Even The New York Post7 which carried two edi-
torials during the crisis saying "Thank God for the 
Atlantic Ocean," has seen the simple truth that 
Munich has left all the old tensions and merely 
created additional problems. But the Post goes on to 
draw completely false lessons from the re,suIts, so 
false that even its own editorial and news columns 
contradict them. After being completely revolted by 
the results of the sell-out they also give thanks that 
we of the United States have had nothing to do with 
it. They conclude that we should now learn to stay 
out of Europe's affairs, because they are not our own. 
But their deep concern for what has happened 
gives the lie to the thesis. The complete triumph of 
Hitler on the Czech issue has given encouragement to 
,every sabre-rattler externally and internally. Our 
own fascists can say with good reason: "Why bother 
arguing with labor around a conference table? Beat 
the hell out of strikers, that's the only way to handle 
them. After all, those tactics are winning in Europe." 
American isolationism, praising heaven for SOlne salt 
and water, is the exact counterpart of Chamberlain's 
isolationism from the affairs of Czechoslovakia. 
The excitement and disillusionment of the crisis 
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have caused others also to become bewildered, even to 
doubt the value of a program of concerted peace 
action. Yet what took place between the powers was 
the exact opposite of concerted action for peace. In-
stead it was the natural outgrowth of continued con-
cessions to the aggressors. The long tedious rou tine 
was repeated as in China, Ethiopia, Spain and Austria. 
Not once did the non-aggressor nations stand firmly 
to protect the weaker states, not once did they 
apply embargoes against the fascists, nor did they ever 
give material aid to the aggrieved. Nor did the U ni ted 
States; and to that extent the pious denials of the 
Post are meaningless and we become parties to the 
crimes by our inactivity. 
THE u. s. AND CONCERTED PEACE ACTION 
This is the lesson of Munich. Had the United 
States played an active role, had we translated our 
moral indignation into concrete-action, we would be 
in a better position to cri ticize the · Bri tish and French, 
but, more important, to have save Czechoslovakia. 
With our political and economic strength clearly 
against the aggressors the cause of world peace would 
unquestionably have been aided. As it has been we 
have become dupes of the war-makers who have 
momentarily conquered by dividing the non-fascist 
states. 
What was true before 'Czechoslovakia is even more 
true today. Capitulation to the fascists does not. pro-
mote peace. The United States cannot stand aloof. 
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The basic weakness of the aggressor nations is ttieir 
internal economic weakness, and large sections of their 
people want a chance to rid themselves of the tyrants 
who rule them. It has been the failure of the demo-
cratic peoples to insist that their governments recog-
nize these facts which has caused so much to be lost 
to sheer bluff. 
If these facts are true, then the alternatives are 
equally true. Embargo the aggressors. Insist that the 
government of the United States take a lead in calling 
a halt to the retreat of democracy. Continue the work 
for peace, recognizing that it alone is the thing which 
Hitler, Mussolini and their satellites fear in the end. 
For the moment Czechoslovakia has been lost, but 
the people of China and Spain are still heroically 
fighting on. They need our help; they must not be 
relegated to "howl ,vith the wolves" also. Freedom 
is too dear to allow the gloom which followed Munich 
to translate itself into defeatism. So long as these 
people are determined to resist, we dare not become 
resigned. Already Neville Chamberlain has turned 
from Prague to Spain. Here is clearly the crux of 
the new European situatio.n; we dare .not fail these 
valiant soldiers who fight today that we need not 
fight tomorrow. 
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